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Abstract 
This article focuses on the recent wave of M&A activity, both vertical and horizontal in TV 
production, aggregation and distribution industries, and discusses the implications of M&A activity for 
competition, industrial and media policymaking. Moreover, it aspires to set a forward-looking 
perspective on the regulation of M&A in the TV industry. It is argued that while EU competition 
policy has difficulties to fully grasp anti-competitive effects resulting from vertical M&A activity in 
particular, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of an economically and 
culturally sustainable, European broadcasting and distribution sector are virtually absent from national 
and European policy agendas. It is particular in the latter two domains of policymaking that policy 
action is necessary. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in TV production, aggregation and distribution 
has been heating up. Consolidation in these industries basically follows a cyclical pattern, with 
economic and regulatory conditions accelerating or slowing down M&A activity. In general, three 
major stages of industry consolidation can be identified. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
represented a seismic change in the American telecommunication landscape, creating a new regulatory 
environment that lifted cross-media ownership and fostered the convergence of broadcasters, phone 
companies and cable TV providers. In the wake of the Act, media, telecommunications and cable 
firms built strategic partnerships (e.g., AOL and Time Warner) helping them in vying for leadership in 
the dot.com marketplace. A second consolidation wave began in the US in 2004 and resulted in the 
four-major-operator landscape controlling over 90% of the US distribution market (with Comcast, 
Time Warner Cable, Verizon and AT&T holding a firm grip on the market). The US industry is now 
entering into a further, and probably final, stage of industry consolidation, marked by the moves of 
industry leaders Comcast (acquiring Time Warner Cable) and AT&T (acquiring DirectTV). Today’s 
 
 
industry transformation is largely driven by the increasing rivalry from Internet and over-the-top 
(OTT) streaming platforms, which are threatening cable’s powerful gatekeeper position in the market. 
Whereas the US industry is already highly concentrated, the list of deal proposals seems to suggest 
that Europe is likely to lead the third wave of consolidation in broadcasting and distribution. As the 
European market is still fragmented with over hundred fixed and mobile operators and the European 
Commission is pushing for a single European telecommunications landscape, the expected, massive 
consolidation will result in a handful of European and, especially, non-European players controlling 
European infrastructure networks. 
Unsurprisingly, research into these matters closely reflects the speed of the subsequent 
consolidation waves in broadcasting and distribution. In the aftermath of the Telecommunications Act, 
many studies focused on the impact of the new regulation on the industry, and on the patterns of 
industry consolidation. Chan-Olmsted (1998) concluded that M&A activity in broadcasting and 
distribution heated up after the passage of the Act, and that cable TV providers opted for horizontal 
consolidation to prepare for the upcoming competition with telecommunications firms. Tseng and 
Litman (1998) analysed the merger between US West and Continental Cablevision, the first one after 
deregulation, and scrutinised the rationales behind the merger. They focused on the fact that not only 
large, but also smaller cable operators merge to become bigger, not only to compete with other cable 
operators, but also because of new entries from telephone, wireless or satellite. Competitive entry by 
satellite providers triggered off a new wave of M&A activity, with an increasing emphasis on vertical 
integration. In the digital era, new players in distribution increase competitive rivalry, upgrading the 
importance of content (e.g., sports rights) as a differentiator. The growing ownership interest of cable 
operators in cable (sports) networks triggered off questions regarding vertical foreclosure and 
discriminatory behaviour at both the upstream and downstream levels (e.g., Chen and Waterman, 
2007; Lee and Kim, 2011; Singer and Sidak, 2007). Meanwhile, Jin (2013) concluded that de-
convergence would become the most significant business trend in the 21st media century, with firms 
focusing on their core activities through de-consolidation. Vertical disintegration allows firms to split 
off business units that can be managed in a more flexible manner. The recent boost in M&A activity in 
broadcasting and distribution, however, suggests that horizontal and vertical mergers are more than 
ever strategically important in the international video landscape. 
This article focuses on the renewed M&A activity in (and between) broadcasting and distribution, 
and discusses the implications of M&A activity for competition, industrial and media policymaking. 
The renewal of M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution markets, and especially its acceleration 
across national markets, is producing global powerhouses that control the entire TV value chain and 
therefore enjoy significant market power. Moreover, vertical M&A deals are producing the blueprint 
for the media and communications industry for the next decades. Since policymakers are struggling 
how to deal with the impact of M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution, and to assess the impact 
of global behemoths in local TV ecosystems, this article questions the role for policymakers in this 
regulatory process. Furthermore, it aspires to set a forward-looking perspective on the regulation of 
M&A in the TV industry. On the basis of a literature study and a qualitative document analysis (of 
annual reports, analyst reports, legislation, case law, green papers, etc.), this article sketches the effects 
of M&A activity and presents the implications of M&A activity for policymakers. First, a brief 
overview of recent M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution markets is presented. Second, the 
effects of M&A activity, both vertical and horizontal, on competition and diversity in TV markets is 
discussed. Third, remedies and recommendations for policymakers are outlined. We argue that while 
EU competition policy has difficulties to fully grasp anti-competitive effects resulting from vertical 
 
 
M&A activity in particular, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of an 
economically and culturally sustainable, European broadcasting and distribution sector are virtually 
absent from national and European policy agendas. It is particular in the latter two domains of 
policymaking that policy action is necessary.  
2. Recent and on-going M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution 
 
2.1 Challenging market conditions 
As mentioned, M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution has been heating up since 2011, largely 
due to the spectacular rise of online video and the arrival of OTT platforms. Although these 
developments might create opportunities for broadcasters and distributors alike, the anticipated shift 
towards streaming video, especially among younger viewing segments, may negatively impact on the 
level of TV advertising income and pay-TV subscription revenue. Although research shows that the 
impact of ‘cord-cutting’ (i.e. cutting pay-TV connections in order to change to low-cost video 
services) crucially depends on the level of network infrastructure, subscription tariffs and the 
attractiveness of the available OTT platforms, and that OTT tends to be a complement rather than a 
substitute to traditional sources of TV (e.g., Baccarne et al., 2013; Fontaine and Noam, 2013), the 
industry is witnessing an increasing rate of pay-TV subscriber defections. Moreover, a growing 
number of subscribers are cutting back on their programming tiers, signing up for smaller, cheaper 
bundles of TV channels, which provides evidence for the ‘cord shaving’ trend (Hagey and 
Ramachandran, 2014). Other studies highlight that, similar to their US counterparts, European pay-TV 
operators start facing a stagnation in subscription revenues and report a lower growth in EBITDA 
margins due to increased programming and infrastructure costs. A report from Digital TV Research 
(2014) forecasts that by 2020 European pay-TV operators will face a fall in pay-TV revenues, and 
reveals that subscriber numbers will drop due to greater competition from digital video platforms. 
With nearly 90% of European households having access to digital TV platforms and a forecasted 99% 
by 2016, digital TV is approaching a saturation stage which leaves little room for expansion. Similar 
to cable TV providers, telecommunications operators are confronted with historically low ARPU 
levels weighted down by cut-throat price wars and regulations (e.g., on roaming tariffs) that further 
erode margins. Against this backdrop, M&A activity is considered an effective strategy to overcome 
these challenging market and regulatory conditions, and is helped by attractive stock valuations, 
availability of debt at low interest rates and the willingness of financial institutes to underwrite these 
high amounts of debt (see Capgemini, 2014 for a detailed overview). 
2.2 Convergence between fixed and mobile distribution 
One structural driver underpinning the current consolidation wave is the accelerating convergence 
between fixed and mobile network distribution. Telecommunications and cable operators, both in 
Europe and the US, anticipate the spectacular shift towards mobile communications, and bet on 
offering quadruple play services (broadband Internet, TV, telephony and mobile services). This 
strategy, enabling customers to get all their household communications from a single service provider, 
lowers churn and reduces customer acquisition costs in the highly-competitive and volatile market for 
telecommunications services (Chan-Olmsted and Guo, 2011). The quest for a bundled 
communications offer, including mobile services, largely explains why fixed network operators have 
been going on a buying spree acquiring wireless service providers. Moreover, the steady stream of 
investments to secure high-capacity network infrastructure is driving fixed and mobile operators 
 
 
altogether. US telecom giant AT&T is expanding its mobile business, but its ambition to become the 
largest mobile operator in the US was thwarted when the Department of Justice prohibited the 
purchase of T-Mobile USA ($39 billion, in 2011). Its proposed $48.5 billion takeover deal for satellite 
provider DirecTV will allow the second-largest US mobile operator to become the biggest US pay-TV 
provider (Gryta and Ramachandran, 2014). Similarly, UK telecom incumbent BT has re-entered the 
mobile market after acquiring EE from Deutsche Telekom and Orange in a deal valued at £12.5 
billion. This offensive move by BT, which has become the main challenger in the pay-TV market, has 
induced competitors Sky and Virgin Media to look for partnerships with mobile operators and is 
definitely leading to a massive consolidation of the UK telecom industry (Raice and Bender, 2014). In 
contrast, world’s second-largest mobile operator Vodafone has a strategy of adding fixed network 
assets to its existing mobile footprint. The UK-based operator not only sold its 45% stake in Verizon 
Wireless to Verizon ($130 billion, in 2013), but heavily expanded its European footprint after 
swallowing German cable operator Kabel Deutschland (€7.7 billion, in 2013) and Spain’s largest cable 
company Ono (€7.2 billion, in 2013) (Henning and Vitorovich, 2013; Roman, 2013). 
 
2.3 Economies of scale, synergies and negotiation power 
Economies of scale are another structural driver for the next generation telecommunication and cable 
industries. They allow for operational efficiency and help in profitably rolling out network upgrades 
and improved services. Greater scale is a powerful answer to the inflated programming costs to secure 
sports rights and retransmission consent from TV broadcasters. According to SNL Kagan (2013) 
retransmission fees in the US grew from $215 million to $762 million between 2006 and 2009, and 
they are projected to exceed $6 billion in 2018. Pay-TV operators’ programming expenses (as a 
proportion of total revenues) have risen from 33.3% to 39.7% between 2004 and 2013, and are likely 
to further erode pay-TV operators’ margins. In this context, scale enables pay-TV operators to exert 
more negotiation power vis-à-vis broadcasters and content suppliers (Evens and Donders, 2013). 
Consolidation in the US cable market is taking excessive proportions with Comcast’s intended 
acquisition of Time Warner Cable ($45.2 billion, in 2014), AT&T’s bid for DirecTV and Charter’s 
purchase of Optimum West ($1.63 billion, in 2013) (Jannarone and Ramachandran, 2013; 
Ramachandran and Cimilluca, 2014). Also in Europe, consolidation is taking place at an ever faster 
pace. Since 2013, BSkyB completed its acquisition of Sky Germany and Sky Italy for £4.9 billion, 
while Liberty Global secured its position as the world’s leading cable operator after buying Virgin 
Media ($23.3 billion) and Dutch pay-TV operator Ziggo ($12.6 billion). Moreover, Liberty has been 
expanding vertically, purchasing shares in UK production company all3media, British free-to-air 
channel ITV and De Vijver Media, a Belgian production and free-to-air TV company. It has been 
unequivocal about its strategy of vertical integration with OTT, TV production and free-to-air TV. 
CEO Mike Fries, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, said such a strategy is a means to 
overcome competition from Netflix-like players and to pay lower retransmission fees (Schechner and 
Zekaria, 2014). 
3. Theories of harm: effects of M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution 
 
3.1 Horizontal integration 
So far most mergers in broadcasting and distribution have been typical examples of a horizontal 
integration strategy, with firms acquiring or merging with other firms competing in the same part of 
the industry value chain (TV production, aggregation and/or distribution). The benefits of horizontal 
 
 
integration in broadcasting and distribution have been widely described in literature. First and 
foremost, horizontal integration helps distributors in building buyer power, enabling them to negotiate 
advantageous deals with broadcasters and other content suppliers. According to Crawford and 
Yurukoglu (2012), broadcasters and distributors meet bilaterally, and bargain à la Nash to determine 
whether to form a carriage agreement and agree upon the input costs (e.g., licensing, retransmission, 
etc.). In this context, M&As are a popular strategy to increase firm size and build bargaining power. 
Chipty and Snyder (1999) have empirically addressed the relationship between firm size and 
bargaining power, and found that large distributors are able to bargain lower prices in their 
negotiations with content suppliers. These results are in line with other studies and are not unique to 
cable distribution (Snyder, 1998; Tyagi, 2001). Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), for example, found 
that large distributors such as Comcast have about 17% lower programming costs than small-sized 
distributors. Through experimental design, Ruffle (2013) identified, however, that subtle changes in 
the buyer-size distribution or the number of sellers in the market can create or negate large-buyer 
discounts. Furthermore, the benefits of horizontal integration can self-evidently also be explained in 
terms of economies of scale, allowing firms to minimise costs and increase margins. 
Horizontal integration strategies may, however, strengthen the market position of the merging firms 
and decrease the level of competition in the market, potentially to the detriment of consumers. While 
benefiting from network effects, powerful distributors can build pivotal power with regard to 
broadcasters. Adilov and Alexander (2006) show that the presence of large buyers may have a make-
or-break effect on a content supplier’s decision to produce, and creates gatekeeping power with large 
distributors. If a distributor enjoys a (quasi-)monopoly position, broadcasters often have no outside 
option and little flexibility to close deals with alternative distribution platforms. The rise of the 
Internet may have broken the distribution bottleneck to a certain extent, but distributors controlling 
large portions of the market remain a crucial outlet for broadcasters to reach their audience, putting 
them in a skewed dependency relationship. This is especially the case in countries, which rely mainly 
on one to two modes of distribution for television consumption (Evens and Donders, 2013). Raskovich 
(2003) somehow nuances pivotal power and claims that large buyers not always benefit from firm size 
in a bargaining context. The reason is that pivotal buyers can no longer credibly abdicate responsibility 
for covering a supplier’s costs and often cross-subsidise consumption by smaller, non-pivotal buyers. 
Moreover, literature shows that horizontally integrated distributors may build excessive power and 
engage in monopoly pricing, which reduces consumer welfare. Several studies have examined price 
evolutions and found positive relationships between market concentration and price increase. The 
more competition in the market, the more consumer prices for TV services are disciplined (e.g., 
Goolsbee and Petrin, 2004; Karikari et al., 2003; Seo, 2008). Other studies assessed the impact on 
programming quality and content diversity. Inderst and Shaffer (2007), for example, show that 
suppliers will strategically choose to produce less differentiated products, which further reduces 
product variety, consumer surplus and welfare. On the contrary, Adilov et al. (2012) found that 
distributors with large bargaining power are more likely to provide programme packages that increase 
social welfare. Whereas small distributors favour à la carte programming, a monopolist with sufficient 
bargaining power bundle programming, which limits increases in programming prices, increases the 
subscribers base and increases social welfare. They nevertheless conclude that asymmetries in 
bargaining power between broadcasters and distributors may be of interest to antitrust and regulatory 
agencies. 
 
 
 
3.2 Vertical integration 
Two economic theories compete with respect to the effects of vertical integration in broadcasting and 
distribution markets. Integration can increase profits either by increasing operational efficiency or 
reducing competitive rivalry, among others through market foreclosure. First, advocates of vertical 
integration claim that vertical mergers improve efficiency in bilateral contracting while reducing 
transaction costs, protecting brand names, and safeguarding intellectual property (Gershon, 2013). 
Additionally, vertical integration allows distributors to create synergies in terms of scale and scope 
economies, and easily share information with producers about viewer tastes and preferences 
(Waterman, 1993). Sharing such information might spur innovation in the form of new (thematic) 
channels, distribution platforms or advertising formats – although it leads to discriminatory behaviour 
when only affiliated broadcasters have access to this information. Furthermore, vertical integration is 
said to eliminate the double marginalisation problem that gives rise to excessive retail pricing (if not 
regulated). Double marginalisation occurs when upstream and downstream firms each have pricing 
power and, taken together, set a double mark-up price. In this context, Evens (2014) suggests that a 
vertical integration strategy helps distributors in reducing transaction costs and, hence, tempering the 
level of retransmission fees paid to broadcasters. Research shows a significant efficiency gain from 
vertical mergers between broadcasters and distributors, resulting into increased programme diversity, 
higher subscriber penetration and price decrease between the merging firms (e.g., Ahn and Litman, 
1997; Ford and Jackson, 1997; Rogerson, 2013; Suzuki, 2006; Waterman and Weiss, 1996). 
 
Figure 1: Foreclosure effects of vertical integration (Source: Evens, 2013: p.62) 
Secondly, vertical integration is said to create anticompetitive effects such as a raise in rival’s 
costs, entry-deterrence and, therefore, market foreclosure for alternative networks and distributors (see 
Figure 1). Vertical integration not only allows firms in a weaker negotiating position to defend against 
powerful players from adjacent stages in the value chain. It is often strategically used to create, or 
exploit, market power by raising entry barriers or allowing price discrimination across different 
customer segments (Rey and Tirole, 2007). If the merging firms have market power on the upstream 
level, input foreclosure might arise. Hence, backward integration creates incentives for the merged 
entity to foreclosure its competitors in the downstream market. Merged firms can thus stop supplying 
rivalling distributors and deny complete access to the necessary input (Doganoglu and Wright, 2010). 
 
 
Conversely, customer foreclosure occurs when broadcasters have exclusive access to the platform of 
an affiliated distributor. Backward integration allows distributors to deny unaffiliated broadcasters 
access to their platforms and subscribers, and give carriage priority to affiliated channels. Research 
provides evidence that vertically integrated distributors are more likely to exclude rivalling networks 
and favour affiliated channels in terms of pricing and positioning (Chen and Waterman, 2007; Hong et 
al., 2011; Waterman and Choi, 2011). Vertically integrated distributors could potentially raise a rival 
network’s cost and its vulnerability to competition by excluding or disadvantaging it (e.g., by charging 
for carriage). Furthermore, studies reveal that vertically integrated distributors are more likely to 
collude with other vertically integrated distributors to carry each other’s networks (Kang, 2005; Lee 
and Kim, 2011). However, the results do not imply that unaffiliated distributors automatically pay 
higher programming prices, nor are they systematically denied access to programming. 
4. Challenges for policymakers 
 
4.1 Competition policy 
The on-going consolidation wave produces national TV distribution markets that get increasingly 
controlled by a few telecommunications and cable operators, which might even operate on an 
international scale. Although there is still fragmentation across Europe with over hundred providers of 
TV services, the convergence between fixed and mobile networks is pushing distribution markets from 
a four-operator to three-operator structure (or less). Incumbent cable operators are nevertheless 
confronted with ever more inter-platform competition from terrestrial, satellite and/or IPTV providers, 
in addition to OTT services. A market with less players resulting from M&A activity does not 
automatically imply social welfare loss as it helps distributors to benefit from economies of scale and 
scope, and to find the money needed for network and programming investments. Especially in smaller 
TV markets, policymakers should ask themselves how new entrants can survive against much bigger 
rivals, and eventually approve mergers between smaller operators to (re-)establish competitive balance 
in the market. Otherwise said, M&A activity enhances the intensity of competition in the market under 
certain conditions. 
Competition authorities, both at the national and European level, should, however, seek to promote 
or maintain market competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct by operators, not often those 
with significant market power. This might imply ex-ante measurements in addition to conventional ex-
post regulation. There might be situations where ex-post regulation is insufficient and, hence, ex-ante 
regulation is recommended. Additional rules (e.g., with regard to exclusive agreements or gatekeeping 
positions) may deem necessary to shape the market, or behaviour of the merging parties, and 
complement the traditional ownership limitations. Moreover, competition authorities should ensure a 
level-playing field in a market that is increasingly marked by convergence, and populated by 
telecommunications, cable and online platforms. Telecommunications operators are in most cases 
highly regulated compared to their cable counterparts and especially OTT platforms (e.g., with regard 
to open access obligations). Regardless of the technical infrastructure on which they operate, operators 
performing in the same stage of the industry value chain should be regulated symmetrically. 
In contrast with gatekeeping positions resulting from horizontal M&As, regulators are less familiar 
with the growing trend towards vertical ownership structures. Although efficiency gains might 
produce a positive outcome, competition authorities should predominantly focus on the anti-
discriminatory behaviour of vertically integrated operators and the accumulation of power that comes 
with it. Especially when these operators have already significant market power in the production, 
 
 
aggregation or distribution stage and want to expand further along the industry value chain, rivals can 
be severely disadvantaged and fair competition could become at risk. Hence, regulators should be 
concerned about the accumulation of bargaining power residing with one gatekeeper and the effects of 
this pivotal power on rivalling broadcasters and distributors. Greater bargaining power often comes at 
the detriment of weaker parties in the industry value chain (i.e. independent producers and smaller 
broadcasters) and creates a zero-sum game with the powerful firm taking the lion share of the value 
created. Therefore, competition authorities should set rules that ensure a fair treatment of all business 
partners and prohibit discriminatory treatment between affiliated and independent undertakings. 
4.2 Industrial policy 
The 2008 global economic crisis and the on-going globalisation of the media industries have acted as a 
catalyst for renewed interest in industrial policy, through which governments actively shape markets 
so as to pursue ‘public interest’ objectives. Industrial policy includes government intervention at the 
supply side and aims at encouraging structural change (e.g., as part of a macro-economic agenda). In 
this context, merger control, as part of the competition policy framework, has been used, both to 
prevent and to promote, the creation of ‘national champions’. The idea behind such government 
intervention is that national champions acquire dominant positions in domestic markets so that they 
can achieve critical mass that is necessary to compete in the European internal market and the global 
marketplace. European member states have been relaxing merger control so as to facilitate mergers 
between national companies and allow a consolidation of strategic national industries including 
telecom and cable (e.g., Italian pay-TV operators Stream and Telepiù merging into a single satellite 
platform). In contrast, competition authorities have also applied these same antitrust rules to protect a 
hostile takeover of a national champion by a foreign (either European or non-European) competitor, 
which tends to suggest that the competition regulation has often been applied according to the 
economic and political interests at stake, and that industrial policy considerations may have been taken 
into account by competition authorities. 
The long-standing dominance of US-based corporations in the ICT industries, together with the rise 
of Asian tigers, has induced European policymakers to encourage ‘European champions’ to compete 
in the global digital market (including network infrastructure and OTT services). The evolution 
towards a worldwide industry, and the subsequent need for scale economies has triggered off the on-
going consolidation wave in the European broadcasting and distribution industries. The Digital 
Agenda proposes a major step forward in the creation of a single telecom market so that Europe can 
become a global digital leader, and the imperative of international competitiveness echoes the view 
towards M&As which prevails in Europe nowadays. The Digital Agenda is, at least at the rhetorical 
level, an example of how Europe is developing industrial policies to address market failure 
(fragmentation in the market due to limited scale) and claim back leadership in a global industry, but it 
needs to be brought into reality with all respect for the current competition policy framework. It makes 
no sense to abandon the existing cross-media ownership rules, and replace the current market structure 
by European telecommunications and cable giants, eventually vertically integrated with broadcasters 
and content suppliers, that hold a dominant position in European markets. Competition policies and 
industrial policies should therefore go hand in hand, since a champions policy not necessarily infringes 
merger control. Without merger control, champions would be able to collect monopoly rent – at the 
expense of European citizens – and would not be incentivized to effectively expand internationally. 
Instead of building European giants, governments should bet on combining merger policy with a 
macro-economic agenda that promotes research, innovation and knowledge sharing, stimulates 
 
 
entrepreneurship, incentivises investments,  provides adequate funding and enhances training and 
education facilities. 
4.3 Media policy 
The future of European media ownership in broadcasting and distribution is, however, more than a 
competition question as it also affects media pluralism, diversity and localness. Only recently, the 
European Commission has re-intensified discussions on media pluralism and transparency of 
ownership structures in particular, organizing a specific event on 3 October 2014 to discuss best 
practices in member states like Austria (#EUMT2014). Despite the importance of maintaining and 
preserving the media’s democratic function, it is fair to say though that the EU and also its member 
states have a complex and at times troubled relationship towards media pluralism. 
On the one hand, few will disagree that the European understanding of media pluralism goes 
beyond limiting government control over media, but extends to avoiding commercial interests 
becoming so overly dominant they can inhibit of free pluralistic exchange of media services. In that 
regard, Europe differs from the US, which has already since the beginning of the 19th century adopted 
a rather libertarian approach to media, assuming a full and uncontrolled functioning of the market 
results in a ‘free flow of ideas’. Several important policy documents such as the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (article 11) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (article 167) do entrust the Community not only with the possibility, but also with the 
responsibility to act in case media freedom and pluralism might be harmed. In this respect, cultural 
policy considerations (e.g., media pluralism) can be pursued by measures that are mainly devised to 
attain other EU policy goals (such as creating fair competition). On the other hand, however, 
translating the shared concerns about media freedom and pluralism into European policy practice has 
at times proven difficult given the European Commission’s dominant focus on the achievement of 
economic policy objectives and member states’ sensitivities regarding their ‘sovereign’ competencies 
in the cultural realm. Member states themselves also take less and less action in the field of M&A. 
Indeed, the Merger Regulation entrusts Member States with powers to review mergers with a 
Community dimension for reasons other than competition goals, among others when a proposed 
merger affects media plurality. Having said that, national competition authorities often lack the 
competencies to take more diverse policy considerations into account. Moreover, many member states 
have with an eye on industrial policy goals (see above) consistently relaxed ownership regulation and 
some (among others Belgium and Denmark) do not even have any media-specific ownership rules. 
This makes any meaningful intervention at the national level in case of M&A activity a challenging 
exercise.  
A combination of national and European measures should be explored in case we want to ensure 
media pluralism, and the importance of local content for identity as well as cultural diversity reasons. 
Firstly, while national media ownership rules have been relaxed over the last decades, policymakers 
should consider (re-)introducing European-wide ownership rules. Whereas the introduction of media 
pluralism rules at the European level turned out to be an impossible exercise in the past, it is clear that 
competition policy in itself is not sufficient to address some concerns in this area. Secondly, several 
countries (among others Belgium, France, Germany) are experimenting with a diversity of taxation 
measures on content carriers, assuming these should not only benefit from exploiting content services, 
but also contribute to the sustainable creation of local content. It is strongly recommendable to analyse 
how effective and efficient these instruments are and to consider, again, European-wide regulation. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
This article investigated the rationale of the renewed M&A wave in broadcasting and distribution 
industries, and discussed the implications for competition, industrial and media policymaking. 
Traditionally, EU policymakers have focused on merger control, as part of the competition policy 
framework, to assess M&A activity on the level of competition in a particular market, and imposed 
behavioural, and to a lesser extent structural, remedies to regulate anti-competitive conduct by 
dominant parties. In contrast, industrial and media-specific policies dealing with the creation of an 
economically and culturally sustainable broadcasting and distribution industry are virtually absent 
both from national and European policy agendas. Competition policy and industrial policy go hand in 
hand, and eventually pursue complementary goals. National, or European, champions can only gain 
competitive advantage with an effective merger control that seeks to promote fair competition in the 
market, and that prevents dominant parties from inefficient, monopoly rent-seeking behaviour. 
Similarly, policymakers have had a complex relationship towards media pluralism and ownership 
transparency in the past. The introduction of European-wide ownership rules, in combination with 
taxation instruments to favour locally-created programming, would therefore strengthen the role of the 
European content creation and distribution sectors in this global economy. These three areas of 
government intervention have always been dealt by like silos, and considered different and 
incompatible levels of governance. However, the complexity of the current global ecosystem and the 
drastic impact of the on-going M&A activity on local markets definitely call for a more integrated 
policy approach towards M&A activity in broadcasting and distribution. We need to see these policy 
areas not as mutually exclusive, but as highly complementary. Cross-fertilization and mutual support 
between competition, industrial and media policymakers therefore become necessary to preserve 
European broadcasting and distribution industries as economically and culturally sustainable, and to 
retain a leading position in the international video landscape. 
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